Assessing the impacts of Aligning the Conformity Assessment and Certification in EU Aviation Security

This paper aims to provide the outcomes of an impact assessment of the conformity assessment and certification (CAC) of security in the European aviation. The impact assessment conducted was part of a study led by Ecorys on behalf of EC DG Enterprise and Industry. At first, the background of the study is explained and importance of reliability of the overall aviation security system is underlined. Need for economically sound decisions is addressed. Next, specific aspects of the aviation security system are discussed. A distinction is made between continuous and disruptive security. The methodology used for the impact assessment is described and the aviation related results are presented. Finally, conclusions are drawn on the need for aligning the regulations and common recognition of conformity assessment and certification in aviation security in view of the outcomes of the impact assessment conducted.
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Disclaimer: “In accordance with Article II.10.3 of the Framework Contract ENTR/2009/050, any opinions expressed in that SECERCA study are those of the Contractor (i.e. ECORYS) only and do not represent the Commission’s official position”.

Evaluation of a PRM/SOIA Approach Procedure at São Paulo International Airport

By Carlos Müller, Rafael Fraga and Cláudio Jorge Pinto Alves

PRM/SOIA (Precision Runway Monitor/Simultaneous Offset Instrument Approach), first implemented at San Francisco International Airport in 2004, is an approach  procedure that can be specifically designed to allow simultaneous approaches at runway systems spaced as close as 750 feet. Once implemented it is expected to increase airport runway capacity and hence contribute to the mitigation of congestions that arise with air traffic growth. Sao Paulo International Airport runway system is composed of two parallel runways about 1,230 feet apart, and so is unable to handle simultaneous approaches with the current traditional approach procedures. This paper using computer simulation (RAMS Plus#) addresses the potential impact of the use of a PRM/SOIA approach procedure at São Paulo International Airport (GRU). The results obtained so far indicate potential reductions of 51% in total airborne flight delays with about 18% increase in arrivals capacity at the airport.

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Airport Punctuality, Congestion and Delay: The Scope for Benchmarking

Airport performance benchmarking increasingly requires level-of-service (LoS) indicators for afair comparison among members of the same peer group. For a true performance analysis such inclusion of quality measures is necessary to differentiate airports with similar pure output quantities, i.e. number of aircraft movements. Since variation of scheduled times versus actual times could substantially cause accumulating operating costs for carriers and could furthermore pose the risk and inconvenience of missed connections for the passengers, this article examines determinants of flight delays at airports, and thereby developing performance indicators such as slot capacity utilization, queueing time and punctuality. The essence of underlying phenomena in queueing theory such as Little’s Law, arrival and departure distributions, and cumulative throughput and demand diagrams are briefly explained. This work’s aim is the exploration of ways of measuring and observing performance quality from actual flight schedules with a focus on usability for subsequent airport benchmarking and traffic modeling.

Systematizing Routing Options in a Global Air Cargo Network Model

airline_networkBy Florian M. Heinitz* and Peter A. Meincke

This article reports on advances in building an air cargo network routing software. This software module is an integral component of a multi-level air cargo supply-demand interaction model. The model is aimed at analyzing and forecasting airborne commodity flows on a global scale. Having an exhaustive overlook of the routing options is essential for assigning airfreight in networks as close to reality as possible. Our modeling deals with cargo “alliances” and sub-networks defined by interlining agreements. In the absence of publicly available data, we develop a route typology, as well as a methodology for subsequent choice set formation. Itinerary level observations and preference data act as yardsticks for this exercise. We demonstrate how to address the relevant spatial-temporal routing options for cargo within a maximum range of adjustment strategies, while keeping computational complexity manageable.

* Corresponding Author

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Factors Influencing Time and Cost Overruns in Aircraft Projects

A400Mby Jörg Bellmann, Andreas Knorr and Rahel Schomaker

All recent major civil as well as military aircraft projects – A380, B787, A400M – have suffered from massive cost overruns and substantial entry-in-service delays of at least two years. In our paper, we intend to overview the press coverage of the aircraft programs of Boeing’s new long-haul wide-body model, the 787 Dreamliner, and the military transport aircraft A400M, designed by European manufacturer Airbus. Using causal mapping, based on a content analysis, we summarize the project events reported in the press that triggered off the chains of causality, which inevitably led to cost overruns and time delays.
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International Business Travel in the Global Economy

international_business_travelEdited by Jonathan Beaverstock, Ben Derudder, James Faulconbridge, Frank Witlox (eds)

Business travel receives relatively little attention both in scientific literature and in the media, and when it does get attention, it is mostly negative. Often, it is seen as a costly toy for the rich and famous. This book gives travel for business purposes the attention it deserves, and it paints a balanced, multifaceted picture of it.

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CRM: The Fundamental of Safety

By Karlene Pettit During the mid 80’s I was working for America West Airlines when CRM– Crew Resource Management– came into full force. Arms folded, eye rolling, and heads shaking, the pilots fought their required three-day CRM course. At the time, CRM was just a classroom training event. And, “They didn’t need it.” The pilots believed CRM would strip away the captain’s authority. “Someone has to be in charge!” This touchy feely psycho-babble was a waste of time, and they didn’t need to be taught how to be nice. We’ve come a long way since then…but we still have a long way to go; especially with the new stressors and uncertainty of the industry. Crew Resource Management, initially Cockpit Resource Management, is the foundation of safety.

CRM consists of the utilization of all resources– people, equipment, and procedures– to increase situational awareness, improve problem solving and decision making skills, enhance teambuilding, and enable better communication. CRM encourages all crewmembers to speak up, and become part of the solution working with the captain. Instead of one pilot, there grew a team. And with this team, grew the synergy of multiple minds and experience levels. Everyone has something they can add. This team has also brought the flight attendants into the loop. Fostering positive communication with the cabin crew eliminated the fear of the all mighty captain, and opened the door to added safety. The cabin crew became they eyes and ears in the back of the plane, and weren’t afraid to speak to the captain when a problem arose. Why is CRM necessary? Eastern Airlines, Flight 401, December 29, 1972. The crew became focused on a landing gear position indicator. Not a big deal. But the crew’s failure to notice that the autopilot had disconnected was a deal breaker. The crew flew their perfectly good airplane into the Everglades killing everyone on board. United Airlines, Flight 173, December 28, 1978. Arriving into Portland, this DC-8 displayed only two of their three green landing gear lights. The captain decided to burn fuel before they touched down. They circled just beyond the runway. The Flight Engineer noticed the fuel running low… too low.

Despite his efforts to convince the captain that they should land, the captain didn’t listen. They crashed short of the runway after they ran out of fuel. 1979, NASA determined the primary cause of these accidents, and many others like them, had been the fault of the flight crew. Pilots were flying perfectly good airplanes into the ground. Human factors were to blame, and the CRM movement began. Shortly thereafter the FAA mandated CRM training for all part 121 airlines. CRM soon impacted the way flight crews were trained, and checked, in the simulator. Now pilots experience full flight simulator sessions conducted with Line Oriented Flight Training scenarios…the all mighty LOFT, and Line Oriented Experience checkrides…the LOE. Pilots are now trained, and checked, as a complete crew. Flight attendants, dispatch, and maintenance all play a role, and can be utilized by the pilot during their simulator event. Crew communications, teamwork, systems knowledge, environmental management, and procedures are all taken into account. How well does this training, and checking, work? It’s exceptional. I had the opportunity to watch a captain with excellent piloting skills fail a checkride because of poor CRM. Not that his failure was a good thing, but it demonstrated the importance of CRM to the flight, and that even the best pilot can’t do it alone. This captain micro-managed the flight deck, and had the second officer so flustered that he couldn’t do anything right. The captain didn’t utilize any resources available. With his attempt to do it all by himself, he forgot to call for the Before Takeoff Checklist, departed without lights, and the list of errors grew long. Another significant accident: American Airlines, Flight 965, December 20, 1995, Cali Columbia. Loss of situational awareness, and poor procedures were ultimately to blame. The crew didn’t pay attention to their multiple threats: Late night flight, two hour delay, last minute runway change, a rushed approach, unfamiliarity with the area, and high terrain. On a side note, I find it interesting that all three of these accidents occurred within five days of Christmas. A coincidence… or another level of distraction? Definitely a threat. Coming soon… how to manage those threats.

Who’s Karlene?

I’m the mother of three daughters, the grandmother of two granddaughters and a grandson. I’ve been married for 29 years. Hold a masters in counseling and a MBA. I’ve worked for 8 airlines… Coastal, Evergreen, Braniff, America West (training department), Guyana, Tower, Northwest, and now Delta. I have 7 Type ratings.  727, 737, 757, 767, 747-200, 747-400, A330 I’ve instructed in the classroom, in the simulator, and on the line for 21 years I put Guyana’s 757 in service… designed and implemented their training program. Wrote their curriculum… training manuals, procedures, emergency manual..etc., taught the ground school and simulator, and was their FAA/CAA designee. America West… 737 and 757 simulator instructor. Northwest, 747-200 Second Officer/ Check Airman… and then 747-400 First Officer For the previous 20 years, I have also worked for Premair.. my second job, instructing in the classroom and in the simulator on the 737 and 757 aircraft. I’m currently flying the A330 for Delta. Final airline home. I just wrote my first novel, an Aviation Thriller…and I’m in the editing phase. Many more to come Follow Karlene Pettit on her personal blog and at!

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